SLHR Labor Economics Lecture Series: Information Asymmetries in College Admissions

SLHR Labor Economics Lecture Series: How do Free Compulsory Education and Early-life Shocks Shape Long-Term Education Attainment?

SLHR Labor Relations Lecture Series: Trade Union Decline and the Scientific Management of Macro-Economic Stability

SLHR Labor Economics Lecture Series: Gender Composition, Social Context, and Academic Performance

SLHR Labor Economics Lecture Series: Employment Stability's Influence on Consumption

Program - 7th Renmin University of China / GLO Annual Conference on "Low Fertility and Population Ageing"

SLHR Labor Economics Lecture Series: How Knowledge Spillovers Shape Healthcare Practices and Innovation

SLHR Social Security Lecture Series: How Does Dementia Diagnosis Matter? Evidence on Health and Economic Well-Being Among Older Adults in the US

SLHR Social Security Lecture Series: Selection Bias in Urban-Rural Resident Medical Insurance Enrollment and Its Welfare Analysis

SLHR Social Security Lecture Series: DRG/DIP Payment Reform and Region-Specific Policy Adaptations

SLHR Human Resource Management Lecture Series: How AI, Robots, and Digital Communication Affect Individuals and Teams

SLHR Human Resource Management Lecture Series: Five Paths to Achieving Theoretical Contributions

SLHR Social Security Lecture Series: Impact of Population Aging on Healthcare Expenditure Changes

Call for Papers: 7th Renmin University of China / GLO Annual Conference on "Low Fertility and Population Ageing"

SLHR Human Resource Management Lecture Series: “Artificial Intelligence and Social Sciences”

SLHR Labor Economics Lecture Series: “Matching Mechanisms, Justified Envy, and College Admissions Outcomes”

Matching mechanisms are crucial in centralized school choice settings and college admissions. This paper studies the world’s largest matching market, Chinese college admissions, and provides novel empirical evidence comparing the Immediate Acceptance (IA) mechanism and the parallel mechanism, a variant of the Deferred Acceptance mechanism. We use administrative data on millions of students and the staggered reform by provinces. Switching from IA to the parallel mechanism reduced unfairness, measured by justified envy, as well as undesirable student outcomes, including null admission and retaking. The paper also highlights the differences across the commonly used intensive-margin stability measures.

SLHR Human Resource Management Lecture Series: “How to Integrate Chinese and Western Perspectives on Managerial Paradoxes?”

SLHR Social Security Lecture Series: “The Power of the Baton: Transitioning from GDP-centric Performance Evaluation to Shared Development”

SLHR Labor Relations Lecture Series: "Data Elements and Innovation Ecosystem"

Professor Rong Ke from the Institute of Economics at the School of Social Sciences, Professor Rong Ke is a tenured professor and doctoral advisor at Tsinghua University, with a Ph.D. from the Uni...