讲座题目：Matching Mechanisms, Justified Envy, and College Admissions Outcomes

内容简介：Matching mechanisms are crucial in centralized school choice settings and college admissions. This paper studies the world’s largest matching market, Chinese college admissions, and provides novel empirical evidence comparing the Immediate Acceptance (IA) mechanism and parallel mechanism, a variant of Deferred Acceptance mechanism. We use administrative data on millions of students and the staggered reform by provinces. Switching from IA to parallel reduced unfairness, measured by justified envy, as well as undesirable student outcomes, including null admission and retaking. The paper also highlights the differences across the commonly used intensive-margin stability measures

主讲人：宋阳 副教授（科尔盖特大学经济学系）

讲座时间：2024年6月27日（周四）13:00—14:30

讲座地点：求是楼347会议室

讲座语言：中英文

主持人：邹先强 讲师

参与人员：热烈欢迎广大师生参加。

主讲人简介：

宋阳博士现任科尔盖特大学经济学系副教授（终身制）,曾任麻省理工大学经济学院访问学者，密歇根大学公共政策学院教育政策研究中心的访问助理教授，明尼苏达大学应用经济学系的访问学者。研究兴趣主要集中在在教育经济学、行为经济学、发展经济学方向，研究课题包含高考录取制度改革对公平性的影响，教育政策变化对择校的影响，以及不同教育及其他公共政策改革的评估分析。其研究成果发表在American Journal of Health Economics, China Economic Review, Economic Inquiry, Journal of Comparative Economics, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Journal of Political Economy Microeconomics, Regional Science and Urban Economics等期刊上，并担任多个经济学及教育学期刊的匿名审稿人。